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UNITED STATES v. SUTTON AND THE SCOPE
OF TITLE IX OF THE ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL ACT OF 1970: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S
NARROW INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING
OF "ENTERPRISE"
INTRODUCTION

In United States v. Sutton' the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted an interpretation of the federal enterprise racketeering statute2 that was directly contrary to previous decisions by five other circuit courts of appeals.3 The fundamental
issue in Sutton was whether the racketeering statute could "be
applied to persons engaged in racketeering activity unrelated
to any legitimate organization but in furtherance of something
the government term[ed] 'a criminal enterprise.' "' The Sixth
Circuit held that the statute could be applied only to persons
engaged in racketeering activity related to legitimate organizations. The court's narrow construction of the statute has created the split among the circuit courts of appeals.
Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 as Title IX of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970.1 Two particular sections of Title IX provide the source of the controversy that has
precipitated the recent division among the courts. Section
1962(c) states:

1605 F.2d 260

(6th Cir. 1979).
18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976).
3 The Ninth, Fifth, Second, Seventh and District of Columbia Circuit Courts of
2

Appeals had adopted contrary interpretations of the statute. United States v. Rone,
598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 993 (1979); United States v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied sub nom. Delph v. United States, 439 U.S. 953 (1978); United
States v. Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977);
United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Hawes, 529
F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 263 (6th Cir. 1979).
s Pub. L. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1976)).
In this comment the statute will be referred to interchangeably as either Title IX or
RICO, an acronym for "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations," which is
the criminal code subtitle for the statute.
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It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated
with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a patternof racketeeringactivity or collection
6
of unlawful debt.

The second relevant provision is section 1961(4); that section
defines "enterprise" as "includ[ing] any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a
legal entity."7 In Sutton the government contended that several individuals who were involved in a number of crimes, including significant heroin distribution and a large-volume stolen property fencing operation, constituted a "criminal
enterprise," 8 and were thus subject to the provisions of Title
IX. The government's argument was founded on the precedent
established by five circuit courts of appeals9 which had held
that Title IX applied to the infiltration of both legitimate and
illegitimate enterprises. The Sutton court rejected this inter' 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976) (emphasis added). A "pattern of racketeering activity"
is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1976) as requiring "at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [enacted Oct. 15,
1970] and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of
imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
"Racketeering activity" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (Supp. 1978) as follows:
(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is
indictable under any of the following provisions of ... United States Code:
[title 18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 224, 471, 472, 473, 659, 664, 891-894, 1084, 1341,
1343, 1503, 1510, 1511, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 2314, 2315, 2341-2346,
2421-2424]; (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States
Code [§§ 186, 501 (c)]; or (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud
in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other
dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States.
7 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976).
1 United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 260, 264-65 (6th Cir. 1979). The government
contended that the defendants were a "group of individuals associated in fact," 18
U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1976), for the purpose of committing crimes, that therefore they
were an "enterprise," and that they conducted "such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity," 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1976), thereby making them
liable under § 1962(c).
' See note 3 supra for a list of these circuit court decisions.
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pretation and determined that Title IX applied only to the infiltration of legitimate enterprises.
In order to determine the proper scope of Title IX and the
meaning of the word "enterprise" in that statute, this comment will examine the judicial treatment of the statute and
the statute's legislative history. Such examination will indicate that the construction expounded by the Sixth Circuit in
Sutton is the better reasoned approach.
I.

A.

"ILLEGAL ENTERPRISES"

UNDER TITLE IX: CASE HISTORY

Early Precedent: Parness, Cappetto, and Moeller

1. Parness: A Broad Interpretationof the Section 1961(4)
Definition of "Enterprise"
The first case to consider the scope of the term "enterprise" in Title IX was United States v. Parness.11 In Parness
the Second Circuit expressly acknowledged that Congress intended that the word "enterprise" be given a very broad definition." The government charged the defendants with interstate transportation of stolen property, 2 and with acquisition
of a foreign hotel through a "pattern of racketeering activity"
consisting of the interstate transportation of the stolen property in violation of Title IX. 13 After adopting a broad construction of "enterprise" the court rejected the defendant's weak
argument that the hotel was not an "enterprise" since it was
in a foreign country.' 4
10503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
" Id. at 439.

,218 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
" The definition of racketeering includes violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976).
See note 6 supra for the statutory definition.
11There really was no question that the hotel was a legitimate enterprise. The
court stated: "'Enterprise' is defined in § 1961(4) to include 'any . . .corporation.'
On its face the proscription is all inclusive. It permits no inference that the Act was
intended to have a parochial application. The legislative history, moreover, strongly
indicates the intent of Congress that this provision be broadly construed." 503 F.2d at

439. It is important to note that this statement was made in response to an argument

that "enterprise" was limited to domestic corporations; the court was not confronted
with the issue of whether or not the statute applied to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises.
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Cappetto: Illegitimate "Enterprise"Included

2.

United States v. Cappetto15 was the first case to confront
the question of whether "enterprise" included illegitimate as
well as legitimate businesses. In Cappetto the defendants argued that their illegal gambling operation 6 was not subject to
Title IX since "Congress' purpose was to protect 'legitimate
business' against infiltration by racketeers."'1 7 While the Seventh Circuit agreed that "one of Congress' targets was the 'infiltration of legitimate organizations by organized crime,'-"8
and that section 1962(a) 9 was "aimed at the target,"20 it held
that "Congress also intended to prohibit any pattern of racketeering activity affecting commerce,"" and that section
1962(b)22 and section 1962(c)3 specifically prohibited such activity. However, the court's attempt to distinguish between
15502

F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).
The defendants were charged with violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
, 502 F.2d at 1358.
IS

I/d.

,Id. Section 1962(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect,
interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market
for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall
not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by
the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either
in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
2 502 F.2d at 1358.
21 Id.
" Section 1962(b) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern
of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce."
2 See note 6 supra and accompanying text for the text of § 1962(c) and definitions of several of its terms. Section 1962(d) provides that "[ilt shall be unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of
this section."
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the use of the term "enterprise" in the three different sections
is contrary to section 1961(4), which assigns
"enterprise" a
24
chapter.
the
throughout
definition
uniform
After citing Parness in support of the proposition that
"enterprise" should be given a "very broad meaning, ' 'r the
court attempted to bolster its holding that illegal gambling
was included in the definition of "enterprise" by quoting legislative history." However, the legislative history relied upon
was not applicable to Title IX; rather, it was in reference to
Title VIII, which deals specifically with gambling. In addition
to this misplaced reliance on legislative history, the courts citation to Parness also was inappropriate inasmuch as the Parness court never addressed the issue of whether Title IX
should be applied to the infiltration of illegitimate, as well as
legitimate, enterprises.27 In light of these shortcomings in the
court's analysis, the Seventh Circuit's decision that "enterprise" included illegitimate operations is assailable.
3. Moeller: Early Disagreement with the Cappetto Decision
In United States v. Moeller25 the District of Connecticut
For an explanation of the differences in the subsections of § 1962, see Note,
Organized Crime and the Infiltration of the Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for
"CriminalActivity," 124 U. PA. L. REv. 192, 202 (1975).
u 502 F.2d at 1358.
" The Cappetto court stated:
There is nothing in the language of subsection (b) or (c)or in the definition
of the Act, Section 1961, to suggest that the enterprise must be a legitimate
one. Congress' intention to include an illegal gambling business in the categories of "racketeering activity" and "enterprise" appears not only from the
language of the statute but from the Senate Committee Report: "Despite
the best efforts made to date by both the Federal and the several State
governments, gambling continues to exist on a large scale to the benefit of
organized crime and the detriment of the American people. A more effective
effort must be mounted to eliminate illegal gambling. In that effort the Federal Government must be able not only to deny the use and facilities of
interstate commerce to the day-to-day operations of illegal gamblers-as it
can do under existing statutes-but also to prohibit directly substantial
U

business enterprises of gambling ...

"

Sen. Rep. 91-617, pp. 72, 73 (1969).

502 F.2d at 1358.
21 See notes 10-14 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Parness.
" 402 F. Supp. 49 (D.Conn. 1975). It should be noted that United States v.
Altese, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977)i will effectuate
a change in the law in the District of Connecticut. See notes 40-41 infra and accompa-
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court discussed the inadequacies of the Cappetto court's reasoning" and held that application of Title IX was restricted to
the infiltration of legitimate businesses." The court stated
that while the statutory definition of "enterprise" contained
no specific words of limitation concerning the legality of endeavors, the legislative history "provides the.clearest indication that Congress intended 'enterprise' to mean legitimate
business." '3' The court also found support for its narrow construction in both the "traditional canon of resolving ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of lenity," 2 and "the concern
. . . not to give federal criminal laws a broad construction
' 3
that 'would alter sensitive federal-state relationships'."
B.

Judicial Treatment of the Statutory Language

In attempting to resolve the controversy concerning the
meaning of "enterprise" in section 1962, several courts have
preferred to look primarily at the statutory language. For example, in United States v. Castellano,34 the court stated:
[W]e believe that the express words of the statute must govnying text for a discussion of Altese.
21 402 F. Supp. at 60.
3 Id.
1I Id. at 58. See notes 45-64 and 82-87 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history of Title IX.
402 F. Supp. at 59 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) and
312
Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83 (1955)).
3 402 F. Supp. at 59 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. at 812, and United
States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953)). The Moeller court stated:
If "enterprise" in § 1962(c) includes unlawful ventures, then the statute
could be used to prosecute any unlawful activity that affected interstate
commerce so long as the participants in the activity committed any two
acts within the broad definition of racketeering activity. Congress may have
power to extend federal criminal jurisdiction that far into areas normally
handled by the states, but it should take a clear indication of legislative
intention before such a sweeping purpose is attributed to it.
402 F. Supp. at 59.
Prior to the court's decision in Moeller the Supreme Court had made reference to
the scope of Title IX when in a footnote in the case of Iannelli v. United States, 420
U.S. 770, 787n.19 (1975), the Court stated that "Title IX . . .seeks to prevent the
infiltration of legitimate business operations affecting interstate commerce by individuals who have obtained investment capital from a pattern of racketeering activity."
Id. (emphasis added).
m 416 F. Supp. 125 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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ern unless there is a clear contrary intent manifested in the
House and Senate Reports. If Congress wished to restrict the
word "enterprise" to "legitimate enterprise" in the statute,
it knew how to do so by simply adding the word "legitimate"
in front of the word "enterprise." 35
Although the Castellano court admitted that the legislative
history revealed that the primary purpose of Title IX was to
prevent the infiltration of racketeering funds into legitimate
business, it also stated that there was no indication that this
was the sole purpose of the statute. 6 The court noted that the
term "enterprise" was clear, and had no adjective limiting it
to "legitimate" enterprises.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
States v. Hawes" cursorily rejected defendant's argument by
citing Cappetto and Parness and stating that the definitions of
"enterprise" and "racketeering activity" contained in the statute both were terms used in section 1962(c) to describe illegal
activity and therefore clearly went beyond the scope of legitimate business activity. 9 In United States v. Altese,4" the Second Circuit Court of Appeals focused on the statutory language and concluded that a broad interpretation of
"enterprise" was appropriate. The court noted that the term
"enterprise" is preceeded by the word "any" in each of the
subsections of section 1962(a)-(c), and that the word "any" is
explicit, thereby bringing racketeering activities under the
term "enterprise."'"
-" Id. at 129.
31 Id. The court had earlier stated that infiltration of legitimate businesses was
one of the targets of Congress in enacting Title IX, but that it was not the only concern. Id. at 127. This language was very similar to that used in the Cappetto case,
which the Castellano court relied upon heavily. See notes 15-27 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Cappetto.

n Id.

- 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).
1' Id. at 479.
, 542 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977).
" Id. at 106. The court explained:
In the light of the continued repetition of the word "any" we cannot say
that "a reading of the statute" evinces a Congressional intent to eliminate
illegitimate businesses from the orbit of the Act. On the contrary we find
ourselves obliged to say that Title IX in its entirety says in clear, precise
and unambiguous language-the use of the word "any"-that all enter-
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also looked to the
text of the statute for support of its decision in United States
v. Rone 2 that illegitimate enterprises come within the purview
of Title IX. The court stated that a reading of Title IX in its
entirety indicates that "any enterprise which is conducted
through a pattern of racketeering activity falls .within the statute,"4 and that "[t]he words 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' appear nowhere in Title IX and nowhere does Congress evince an
intent to make such a distinction.""
II.

A.

"ILLGAL ENTERPRISES" UNDER TITLE IX: STATUTORY
HISTORY

The Legislative History: An Overview

The legislative history of Title IX clearly reflects a congressional intention to address the problems of the infiltration
of legitimate business by organized crime." The difficulty of
prises that are conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt fall within the interdiction. Congress could, if it
intended any other meaning, have inserted a single word of restriction.Instead it left out the word and inserted a clause providing that the provisions
of Title IX "be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes."
542 F.2d at 106 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
It should be noted however that Judge Van Graafeiland stated that the majority's
great reliance on the fact that the word "any" precedes "enterprise" escaped him.
"'Enterprise' is defined in [§1961(4)]. If, in fact, that definition encompasses only
legitimate business or organizations, placing the word 'any' before the defined phrase
in § 1962 should not expand its meaning." Id. at 107 (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting).
In United States v. Swiderski, 593 F.2d 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S.
Ct. 2055, 2056 (1979), the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the
position advanced by the majority in Altese in support of its decision that the statute
should be given a broad meaning. Id. at 1249.
4 598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
a Id. at 568.
' Id. There have been several other cases which also have held that "enterprise"
includes illegitimate endeavors. See United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1054 (5th
Cir. 1977) (where defendants were convicted of operating a lucrative commercial enterprise specializing in prostitution); and United States v. Morris, 532 F.2d 436 (5th
Cir. 1977) (involving an illegal card game fraud).
See also United States v. Fineman, 434 F. Supp. 189 (E.D.Wis. 1977); United
States v. Hansen, 422 F. Supp. 430 (E.D.Wis. 1976), af'd, 583 F.2d 325 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978).
0 See McClellan, The Organized Crime Act (S.30) Or Its Critics: Which Threatens Civil Liberties? 46 NoTRE DAME LAw. 55 (1970). This article, authored by Senator
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isolating any specific congressional repudiation of the notion
that Title IX applies to illegal businesses can be explained by
apparent congressional agreement that the Act would apply
only to infiltration of legitimate business."
At this point, specific reference to the legislative history is
helpful and indeed, imperative. The Senate Report indicates
that Title IX "has as its purpose the elimination of the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce," 47 and that the
legislation was a recognition "that present efforts to dislodge
the forces of organized crime from legitimate fields of endeavor have proven unsuccessful."" Other language in the
Senate Report clarifies that Congress contemplated that Title
IX would bring "to bear on the infiltration of organized crime
into legitimate business or other organizations the full panoply
of civil remedies

. . .

now available in the antitrust area.""'

John L. McClellan, sponsor of Title IX, provides excellent insight into congressional
intent. McClellan explicitly states that Title IX was "aimed at removing organized
crime from our legitimate organizations." Id. at 141. The Senator cited several examples of organized crime's infiltration of legitimate businesses, e.g., hotel chains,
banks, laundries, grocery chains, id. at 142, and concluded that Title IX offered "the
first major hope of beginning to eradicate the growing organized criminal influence in
legitimate commerce. . . ... Id. at 146. According to Senator McClellan, the Department of Justice also supported Title IX and felt that it could be "effectively utilized
to remove the influence of organized crime from legitimate business." Id. at 140
(quoting from Hearings on Gambling and Organized Crime Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 404-05 (1961)).
,6 Note, Organized Crime and the Infiltrationof Legitimate Business: Civil Remedies for "CriminalActivity", 124 U .PA. L. Rxv. 192, 204 (1975). See also Comment,
Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970: An Analysis of Issues Arising in
Its Interpretation,27 DEPAUL L. Rzv. 89, 96-99 (1977). But see Atkinson, "Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations" 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal
Criminal Statutes, 69 J.Cmn. L. C. & P. S. 1, 12-13 (1978).
'7 S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1969).
" Id. at 79.
" Id. at 81. The Senate Report also indicated that the legislation represented
"the committee's careful efforts to fashion new remedies to deal with the infiltration
of organized crime into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce."
Id. at 83. In a section-by-section analysis, the report discussed the definitions set forth
in § 1961:
Subsection (1) defines "racketeering activity" to include those crimes
most often associated with organized crime, especially those associated with
the infiltration of legitimate organizations.
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The House Report contains more of the same type of language,"0 and even those dissenting from the Act's promulgation stated that "Title IX . . . seeks to stymie crime's growing
infiltration of legitimate business."" The floor debates also indicate a clear intent that Title IX apply to infiltration of legitimate business."
Subsection (4) defines "enterprise" to include associations in fact, as
well as legally recognized associative entities. Thus, infiltration of any associative group by any individual or group capable of holding a property
interest can be reached.
Subsection (5) defines "pattern of racketeering activity" to require at
least two acts of racketeering activity, as defined above.
The concept of "pattern" is essential to the operation of the statute.
One isolated "racketeering activity" was thought insufficient to trigger the
remedies provided under the proposed chapter, largely because the net
would be too large and the remedies disproportionate to the gravity of the
offense. The target of title IX is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration
of legitimate business normally requires more than one "racketeering activity" and the threat of continuing activity to be effective.
Id. at 158.
H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56-60, reprintedin [1970] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4007, 4032-36.
5, Id. at 4081 (dissenting views of Representatives Conyers, Mikva and Ryan).
Their primary objection to Title IX was that
the prosecution, absent any prior conviction, would have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt two illegal acts in order to establish the "pattern." Yet, if
it could secure even one conviction, it would not need this section.

Id.

Thus, in their zealousness to get at organized crime, the drafters of this
bill have employed language which may only succeed in erecting a procedure to insulate its operants from successful prosecution under this title.

5 2 Several statements made in relation to Title IX evidence this intent. Senator
Byrd referred to organized crime's "alarming expansion into the field of legitimate
business. . . . " 116 CONG. Rxc. 607 (1970). Senator Thurmond referred to the prob-

lem of "racketeers . . . gaining inroads into legitimate business. . .

."

Id. at 953.

Several Representatives also had similar impressions. Representative Celler
stated that "Title IX is designed to inhibit the infiltration of legitimate business by
organized crime." Id. at 35196. Representative St. Germain commented that "Title
IX.. . is aimed at keeping organized crime out of legitimate businesses through the
use of both criminal and civil penalties." Id. at 35200. Representative Poff, floor manager for the bill, referred to "[t]he money which the syndicate uses to infiltrate legitimate business enterprises . . . " id. at 35201, and Representative Kleppe referred to
"the suppression of the infiltration of legitimate enterprises by racketeers . . . ." Id.

at 35206. Representative Railsback stated that "[Title IX] is designed to deal with
the infiltration of organized crime into legitimate business and labor. The title makes
it a crime to use organized crime profits or methods to establish, acquire, or operate
any legitimate business." Id. at 35304. Representative Anderson felt that "Title IX is
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B. Judicial Treatment of the Legislative History
As previously noted, the Cappetto and Moeller courts
have each examined the statutory history of Title IX, with
widely divergent interpretations.53 In United States v. Rone,54
however, the Ninth Circuit asserted that an examination of
legislative history is inappropriate when a statute is patently
unambiguous." The court reasoned that the proper function of
legislative history is to rectify inconsistencies on the face of a
statute rather than to create them. 6 Despite this adamant refusal to consider the legislative history when faced with a
clearly worded statute, the court did state that the legislative
history was consistent with its decision that the statute applied to the infiltration of both illegitimate and legitimate enterprises.57 While recognizing that the problem of infiltration
of legitimate business was one significant purpose of the legislation, the Ninth Circuit found that the "recognition of this
particular purpose hardly leads to the conclusion that § 1962
applies only in the case of an actual infiltration of a legitimate
business.""8
In United States v. Elliot" the Fifth Circuit held that
"[o]n its face and in light of its legislative history, [Title IX]
aimed at keeping organized crime out of legitimate business through the use of both
criminal and civil penalties." Id. at 35319. Representative Pepper noted the "problem
which has plagued law enforcement for the last two decades, namely, the movement
of organized crime into the legitimate business community." Id. at 35361. Representative Poff concluded that "our present laws are inadequate to remove criminal influences from legitimate endeavor organizations." Id. at 35193. Finally, Poff noted:
[Plerhaps the single most alarming aspect of the organized crime problem
in the United States in recent years has been the growing infestation of
racketeers into legitimate business enterprises. . . .Title IX of S.30 provides the machinery whereby the infiltration of racketeers into legitimate
businesses can be stopped and the process can be reversed when such infiltration does occur.
Id. at 35295.
- See notes 15-27 supra and accompanying text for the views of the Cappetto
court. See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text for the views of the Moeller
court.
5'598 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 569.

SId.
57Id.
a Id.

5 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1978).
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clearly encompasses 'not only legitimate businesses but also
enterprises which are from their inception organized for illicit
purposes.',, However, the court cited no specific legislative
history to support this statement."1
Judge Van Graafeiland's dissenting opinion in United
States v. Altesell provides a different viewpoint on the need
for an analysis of legislative history. Judge Van Graafeiland
stated that he felt "duty bound to examine the legislative history to ascertain Congressional intent. In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or word
therein. Rather we must look to the provisions of the whole
10Id. at 897 (citing United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1073 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978)). The court also stated that "[tihere is no
distinction, for 'enterprise' purposes, between a duly formed corporation that elects
officers and holds annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a
secret criminal network." 571 F.2d at 898.
",In a footnote, the Fifth Circuit merely stated that the legislative history supported a broad application of the statutes. 571 F.2d at 897 n.17. The court referred to
the "Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose" of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1976). The Act's statement of purpose
provides:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal
use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as
syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the
importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and
other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly
used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to
subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities
in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system,
harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free
competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the
domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its
citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the
evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or
remedies to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government
are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.
It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
in the United States by strengthening [sic] the legal tools in the evidencegathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing
enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of
those engaged in organized crime.
62 542 F.2d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).

1979-801

UNITED STATES V.

SUTTON

law so that we may give effect to the legislative will." 3 Judge
Van Graafeiland also espoused a different view of the meaning
of the legislative history; he concluded that "[a] review of legislative history of Title IX leaves no doubt that Congress never
contemplated that 'enterprise' as used in §§ 1961, 1962 would
extend beyond legitimate business or organizations." 4

III.

United States v. Sutton: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT'S ViEw OF
THE SCOPE OF TITLE IX

In the face of the precedent established by five other circuit courts6 5 the Sixth Circuit was confronted with the task of
determining the scope of RICO in United States v. Sutton.6
By relying on the language of the statute," the legislative history8 and traditional canons guiding the construction of criminal statutes, 9 the Sixth Circuit held that Title IX proscribed
only the infiltration of legitimate enterprises through patterns
of racketeering activity. 0
A. The Sixth Circuit'sAnalysis of the Language of the Statute: "The Plain Meaning of the Words in Context"
Those circuits that have adopted a broad construction of
the term "enterprise" as it is used in RICO have supported
their interpretation by focusing on three aspects of the statutory language. First, those courts have emphasized that the
statutory language is unambiguous, and second, that a literal
reading of the statute indicates that it applies to "any enterprise." Finally, those circuits have reasoned that because the
words "legitimate" and "illegitimate" do not appear in the
63

Id.

"

Id. at 108.

See note 3 supra for decisions of other circuit courts of appeals prior to the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Sutton.
" 605 F.2d 260 (6th Cir. 1979).
9 See notes 71-81 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the relevant statutory language.
"See notes 82-87 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the legislative history.
" See notes 88-95 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's consideration of these traditional canons of construction.
,1605 F.2d at 270.
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statute, a distinction between legitimate and illegitimate enterprises could not be justified."
In Sutton, the Sixth Circuit rejected a "rigorous fidelity
to the text ' 7 2 of the statute; rather, the court considered the
implications of a "deceptively literal treatment"7 3 and held
that such a construction would result in section 1962(c)'s becoming a "purposeless circumlocution."74 An analysis of the
government's argument in Sutton illustrates that an application of section 1962(c) to the infiltration of illegitimate enterprise would indeed render the statute "purposeless." The government contended that the federal enterprise statute applied
to the defendant because: (1) the defendants were engaged in
a pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) the defendants were
operating an "enterprise"-the enterprise of racketeering.75 Although the government conceded that this enterprise was illegitimate, it advanced the broad interpretation adopted by the
other circuit courts. As the Sutton court observed, "applying
the statute in this fashion renders the 'enterprise' element of
the crime wholly redundant and transforms the statute into a
simple proscription against 'patterns of racketeering activity.'

7

The court stated that such an application is inconsis-

tent with the statute as written:
Surely, the draftsmen would not have opted for so complex a
formulation if the legislative purpose had been merely to
proscribe racketeering, without more. A straightforward prohibition against engaging in "patterns of racketeering activity" would have sufficed, and there would have
been no need
77
for a reference to "enterprises" of any sort.

The Sixth Circuit concluded that in order for the word
"enterprise" to have any "independent significance"7 and for
7, See notes 34-44 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the other five
circuits' treatment of the statutory language.
72

605 F.2d at 265.

I'
Id.

7, Id. at 266.
7' Id. at 269.
70 Id.

Id. at 266.
at 269.

' Id.
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the statute to be more than a "purposeless circumlocution," 9
the statute must be read to proscribe only the infiltration of
legitimate enterprises." By so holding, the court rejected the
literal interpretation of the statute adopted by other circuits
and instead relied upon the "plain meaning of the words in
81
context."
B.

The Sixth Circuit'sAnalysis of the Legislative History

As discussed above,"2 those circuits that have adopted a
broad construction of "enterprise" have held either that scrutiny of the legislative history is inappropriate in light of the
statute's facial clarity,s or that the legislative history does not
reflect an unequivocal congressional intention to limit RICO
solely to the infiltration of legitimate enterprises.8 In contrast
to other circuits, the Sixth Circuit stated that the "unambigu, Id. at 266.

The court observed that the narrow construction of the statute was proper because such an interpretation "infuses some content into each element of the crime."
605 F.2d at 269. The court stated:
All of the words of section 1962(c) take on some independent significance
when the statute is applied, for example, to a shop steward who conducts
the affairs of his labor union through a pattern of extortion, bribery and
fraud. The same cannot be said for a construction that would permit the
prosecution of illegal gamblers for conducting illegal gambling through a
pattern of illegal gambling or of prostitutes for conducting prostitution
through a pattern of prostitution.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
91Id. at 266. The court reasoned:
Common sense. . . leads us to reject the government's reading and to
seek a construction that gives some content to each element of the crime set
forth in the text. The plain meaning of the words in context indicates that
the reference to "enterprise" was included to denote an entity larger than,
and conceptually distinct from, any "pattern of racketeering activity"
through which the enterprise's "affairs" might be conducted. If the "enterprise" element of the crime is to have independent meaning, but is still to
encompass "criminal enterprises" as the government contends, then a
"criminal enterprise" must involve something more than simply an individual or group engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.
Id.
, See notes 53-64 supra and accompanying text for the other circuits' treatment
of the legislative history.
13 United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1979). See notes 54-58 supra
and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rone case.
" See notes 58-61 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this position.
'o

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 68

ous thrust" 5 of the legislative history supports a narrow construction of the statute. After consideration of the history,"
the court found that the history
conclusively demonstrates that RICO was enacted in response to the growing subversion of our society's legitimate
institutions of business and labor by organized crime, a relatively recent development that Congress deemed a significantly more dangerous threat to the nation's social and economic stability than the age-old problem of crime for crime's
sake."7

C. The Sixth Circuit'sApplication of Traditional Canons of
Construction
In United States v. Moeller,"5 the federal district court for
Connecticut rejected the broad definition of RICO espoused by
the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Cappetto.9 In adopting the narrow interpretation that RICO should be applied
only to the infiltration of legitimate enterprises, the court utilized traditional canons of construction." In Sutton, the Sixth
Circuit employed the same guidelines and reached the same
" 605 F.2d at 269. In commenting on the clarity of the legislative history, the
court observed:
Legislative history is sometimes equivocal, and arguments from it may
not always be dispositive of concrete issues of statutory construction. But,
on this issue, we feel confident in concluding that the Congress was of one
mind. Senator McClellan summed up the legislative consensus nicely during the floor debates when he characterized the special class of criminals at
whom RICO was aimed as those who "operate illegitimately in legitimate
channels."
Id. at 268 (footnote omitted) (citing 116 CONG. REc. at 8671 (1970)).
" 605 F.2d at 266-69.
" Id. at 268. The Sixth Circuit emphasized that:
"Illegitimate business," so-called, is already comprehensively proscribed
and severely punished by the many provisions of state and federal law listed
under RICO's definition of "racketeering activity." RICO's evident purpose
was to single out racketeering activity undertaken in connection with the
subversion of legitimate institutions as a special case, deserving of even
harsher penal sanctions.
Id.
"402 F. Supp. 49 (D. Conn. 1975). See notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text
for a discussion of the Moeller decision.
- 502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975). See notes 15-27
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Cappetto.
" 402 F. Supp. at 59.
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result.
Like the Moeller court, the Sixth Circuit in Sutton applied the tenet that "'ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity'. . . unless the legislature has spoken 'plainly and unmistakably' to
the contrary."" The court observed that inasmuch as the legislative history of RICO "plainly and unmistakably" supported a narrow construction of the statute," "the maxim applies with special force and tells us that we ought not to strain
to accommodate the government's desire for a broader
construction."9 3
The Sutton court also applied principles of federalism in
concluding that the statute be narrowly construed. 4 The court
stated that a broad interpretation of the statute
would take us much further into areas traditionally left to
state regulation by making a federal felon out of "any individual" or any member of a "group" who has committed any
two of the broad range of state offenses denominated "racketeering activity" under section 1961(1). We do not seriously
doubt the power of Congress to undertake such a bold expansion of federal criminal jurisdiction. But we will not simply assume that Congress has done so with this statute,
when the text, at best, is ambiguous on the matter and the
legislative history suggests a different construction that
would not alter the traditional division of responsibilities between federal and state governments quite so radically. 5
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Sutton
has amplified the controversy concerning the scope of Title
IX's definition of "enterprise." By holding that RICO proscribes only the infiltration of legitimate enterprises through
patterns of racketeering activity, the Sixth Circuit rebuffed
605 F.2d at 269 (citing Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971)).
Id. at 269. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Sixth Circuit's analysis of the legislative history in Sutton.
'3 Id. at 269-70.
" Id. at 270.
, Id. For a similar viewpoint see United States v. Moeller, 402 F. Supp. 49, 59
(D. Conn. 1975).
"
"
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precedent established by five other circuits and has paved the
way for the Supreme Court's resolution of this problem in
statutory construction. 6
The legislative history, the "plain meaning" of the statutory language and traditional canons of construction all support the Sixth Circuit's narrow interpretation. Even a cursory
examination of the legislative history reveals a congressional
intent that RICO be applied to the infiltration of legitimate
enterprises." The absence of a specific congressional refutation
of RICO's applying to illegitimate enterprises can be explained by the fact that Congress never envisioned, much less
intended, that Title IX would be applied in such a manner."
The cases that have permitted the government to apply RICO
to illegitimate enterprises have refused either to look to the
legislative history, relied on legislative history not relating to
Title IX, or relied on cases which have made similar mistakes.
Furthermore, the language of the statute militates against a
broad construction; as the Sixth Circuit argued, it is illogical
to suggest that Congress would have drafted "so complex a
formulation if the legislative purpose had been merely to proscribe racketeering without more.""9 Similarly, the fundamental principle that ambiguous criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity and the reluctance to infringe upon
state criminal jurisdiction both mandate that a broad reading
of the scope of Title IX is inappropriate.' 0
Although the foregoing considerations suggest that the
Sixth Circuit's analysis in Sutton represents the better reasoned approach, there is little hope that the other circuits will
98 The "character of reasons which will be considered," while not "controlling nor
fully measuring the court's discretion" in governing review on certiorari by the Supreme Court include "[w]here a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict

with the decision of another court of appeals on the same matter

... "

Sup. Ct. R.

19(1)(b), 398 U.S. 1030 (1970).
11For a general discussion of the statute's legislative history see notes 45-52 supra
and accompanying text. See notes 82-87 supra and accompanying text for the Sixth
Circuit's analysis of the legislative history in Sutton.
" See note 46 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this point.
605 F.2d at 266. See notes 71-81 supra and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Sixth Circuit's analysis of the language of Title IX.
"I See notes 88-95 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Sixth
Circuit's application of traditional canons of construction.
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deviate from their interpretations. Indeed, in United States v.
Aleman,10 1 a case decided after Sutton, the Seventh Circuit
did not adopt the Sixth Circuit's interpretation and reaffirmed
its holding in United States v. Cappetto,52 despite a dissenting opinion that urged the court to adopt the Sixth Circuit's
"irrefutable" analysis." 3 In light of the improbability that this
interpretive dispute will be resolved by the circuits, it is incumbent upon the Supreme Court to clarify the scope of Title
IX. In so doing, the Court should adopt the position espoused
by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Sutton.
Gary Wayne Hart

101609

F.2d 298 (7th Cir. 1979).

102502 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925 (1975).

11 609 F.2d at 311-12 (Swygert, J., dissenting). In advocating adoption of the
Sixth Circuit's narrow interpretation of RICO, Judge Swygert argued that in order to
construe RICO to apply to the infiltration of illegitimate enterprises one has to assume that criminal defendants "infiltrat[e] their own unlawful enterprise through a
'pattern of racketeering activity.' . .. [This assumption is absurd. To infiltrate an
enterprise, that is, 'to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs [section 1962(c)],' the enterprise must preexist before it is infiltrated by racketeering." Id. at 311.

